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Editorial 
DON'T TRADE 
WITH MASS MURDERERS 
The main item in this issue is an interview of Eliezer Bonay 
who served as what he himself calls "a puppet" of the In-
donesians, as their first Governor of West Irian. In this in-
terview he said: 
From 1963 till 1969, up to the time of the so-called 
"referendum" - in fact there never was any referen-
dum - 30,000 people were murdered. All that happen-
ed up to 1969, particularly from the time of the people's 
rebellion in Manokwari in 1965. They kidnapped people, 
one by ·one. Anyone under suspicion in the regions was 
killed. Many villages were bombed during a number of 
rebellions, in Manokwari, in Enarotali, and in many 
other places. Up to the time of the so-called "referen-
dum" alone, 30,000 people were murdered. Then many 
more were killed after 1969, in 1975, then in later 
years. 
In January 1975 (TAPOL Bulletin No 8), we quoted exten-
sively from reports by a Dutch journalist, Henk de Mari, in 
De Telegraf (11, 12and19October,1974)whichalso gave 
a figure of 30,000 killed in the first period of Indonesian 
rule in West Papua. He described in detail one example of 
mass killings that he was able to investigate. We reproduce 
this (see box, pages 8-9) because it provides independent 
testimony of what Eliezer Bonay told TAPOL in his 
interview. 
We all know plenty about the 1965-66 mass killings of 
at least half a million people in Indonesia, and about the 
estimated 200,000 people killed in East Timor since In-
donesia's invasion in 1975. The mass killings in West 
Papua are much less widely known, but they too must be 
added to the list of barbaric crimes for which Indonesia's 
present rulers are responsible. 
Western governments choose to turn a blind eye to this 
record. For them, the present situation in Indonesia means 
"good business", as Britain's Minister of Trade clearly be-
lieves (see page 15). In fact, they are doing business with 
mass murderers; they act with great speed to remove awk-
ward obstacles to trade Qike Britain's tactless quota system 
on textile imports from Indonesia, quickly removed on Mrs 
Thatcher's instructions) in order to sell more Hawks and 
other military equipment to a government that has for 16 
years been engaged in a consistent pattern of bestiality to 
stamp out any resistance to their rule. 
Much still needs to be done to alert world opinion to 
the horrors of life under military domination, in Indonesia, 
in East Timor, in West Papua, and in other places like Aceh. 
Bonay's interview will, we hope, be a contribution to this. 
Much still needs to be done to expose the cynicism of 
governments which turn a blind eye to crimes committed 
by a regime which offers them attractive markets after 
having eliminated all political opposition by the most 
bestial of methods. 
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KOPKAMTIB INTERVENTION IN LABOUR 
DISPUTES INSTITUTIONALISED 
The year 1981 has seen a significant move towards institu-
tionalising the role of the Army in intervening in labour 
disputes . 
KOPKAMTIB, the Army's security agency, has now be-
come an integral part of the government's mechanism to 
supervise and control the entire area of labour disputes. 
This has been ensured by the creation of a new body called 
Assistance Team for Labour Problems (Team Bantuan 
Masalah Perburuhan) with direct KOPKAMTIB participa-
tion. The Team, set up in July 1981, is formally headed by 
the Department of Labour (Depnakertrans) and also inclu-
des representatives of other government departments, of 
employers' organisations and of the Army-<:ontrolled 
trade union federation , FBSI. KOPKAMTIB's role in 
bringing about the creation of this Team was underlined 
by the presence of Admiral Sudomo, KOPKAMTIB Com-
mander, at the Team's installation in July. (Merdeka, 
14 July, 1981) 
Speaking at a conference of "workers' representa-
tives" in Jakarta a month later, Sudomo described 
KOPKAMTIB's role in this Team as "passive" . He said: 
"KOPKAMTIB will remain in the background. Only if a 
problem cannot be settled will KOPKAMTIB help to reach 
a settlement. (Angkatan Bersenjata, 28 August 1981.) 
In fact , KOPKAMTIB's is the opposite of "passive" . Its 
regional executive officers , the LAKSUSDAs, were instruc-
ted , in a secret radiogram from KOPKAMTIB in February 
this year, to intervene directly when "activities by workers 
and instigators . . . are leading towards disturbances in 
security . . . and national development." (See box for the 
text of this radiogram.) 
The constant use of the term "security disturbances" in 
Sudomo's speech and also in his radiogram to the 
LAKSUSDAs clearly shows that the Army will use the anti-
subversion laws and the very severe penalties they stipulate, 
against workers who take action in defence of their rights. 
Yap: "Workers Need Not Obey the New Team" 
Expressing disquiet about the creation of this new organ, 
the human rights lawyer, Mr Yap Thiam Hien declared re-
cently that the Team "has not been enacted by law and it is 
therefore not necessary for workers to comply with its deci-
si9ns" . According to the labour laws in force, the agencies 
charged with handling labour disputes are the regional and 
central arbitration committees. (Kompas, 17 July 1981) 
He went on to say, however;· that the trouble is that 
workers have lost confidence in these arbitration com-
mittees, which is why so many workers involved in disputes 
have resorted to taking their complaints direct to Parlia-
ment. This is hardly surprising, said Yap, for it is no longer 
a secret that the arbitration committees have fallen under 
the control of the employers. 
Sudomo Warns : "Strikes Won't be Tolerated" 
In his speech to the conference of "workers' representatives" 
referred to above (which took place at Hotel Kartika 
Chandra, one of Jakarta's super-luxury hotels) Sudomo 
warned workers not to use the strike weapon in their dis-
putes with management. "Leftist groups are beginning to 
re-emerge in Indonesian society and disturbances such as 
strikes and the like could be utilised by them for their own 
purposes." 
He told his audience that strikes are not only harmful to 
the interests of the workers and the employers but also dis-
rupt economic stability. Therefore, in the coming period, 
"strikes will not be tolerated". There are signs that the in-
creased conflict between workers and employers is leading 
towards the use of violence and force. "This is what makes 
me afraid that they will eventually cause disturbances in 
security and economic stability." Ankatan Bersenjata, 28 
August, 1981 ). In fact, the only real increase is in State 
violence. 
KOPKAMTIB INSTRUCTION 
Jn a secret, cabled Instruction to all regional military 
commanders, in their capacity as regional executive 
officers (LAKSUSDA) of KOPKAMTIB, the Com-
mander of KOPKAMTIB, General Sudomo, has ord-
dered direct military intervention in labour disputes. 
The Instruction, a copy of which recently reached 
TAPOL, is numbered TR.40/KOPKAM/11/1981 and 
bears the date, 12th February 1981. 
The full text of the radiogram reads as follows: 
A. In order to bring order to labour disputes in each 
respective region, the LAKSUSDA should encour-
age the parties concerned to employ the mechan-
isms for settlement as provided for by the regula-
tions in force, namely: 
1. through official, bipartite forums. 
2. through official tripartite channels. 
3. through the regional arbitration committee (P4D) 
and, as the last resort, the regional arbitration 
committee (P4D) at the centre. 
B. To prevent the defence of workers' disputes from 
being handled by individuals or organisations out-
side the channels of the FBSI law team or other 
official law agencies requested by the workers. 
C. In the case of activities undertaken by workers and 
instigators which are leading towards disturbances 
in security and in the implementation of national 
development, the LAKSUSDAs should take steps 
in accordance with the existing powers and guided 
by Presidential Decree No. 7, 1963 (concerning 
anti-subversion? TAPOL). * 
D. The recipient to whom this is addressed should 
draw up an inventory of workers' basis-organisa-
tions, and should report each development to the 
Commander/Chief-of-Staff of KOPKAMTIB. 
(slightly abridged.) 
* The Anti-subversion Law was PP No 11/1963. The 
sense of this paragraph suggests that this is the presi-
dential decree (PP) being referred to, although the 
number 7 is written. If any reader knows what 
PP7/1963 deals with, please let us know. 
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SPOTLIGHT ON A PRISONER 
JOESOEF ISHAK: JOURNALIST AND PUBLISHER 
Joesoef Ishak, one of the two directors of the publishing 
company, Has ta Mitra, was arrested on 4 October this 
year and is being held incommunicado. He spent a month 
at Military Police headquarters in Guntur, Jakarta before 
being moved to a Jakarta Military Command Centre in 
Jalan Kramat V. 
Prior to his arrest, Joesoef had been under continual 
harassment from the authorities since August last year 
when Hasta Mitra published Bumi Manusia, a novel by 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer and followed this up by the 
publication of Anak Semua Bangsa by the same author. 
Both he and the other company director, Hasyim Rachman 
were repeatedly summoned for interrogation. On 29 May 
this year, the two books were banned and the company had 
to abandon its plans to publish other works by Pramoedya. 
Joesoef was born in Sumatra in 1927 and commenced 
his career as a journalist soon after the proclamation of In-
donesian independence in 1945. After working several years 
for local newspapers he moved to Jakarta and eventually 
joined the staff of the nationalist daily, Merdeka. One of his 
special interests was writing music reviews. As an active 
member of the Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI), 
he attended several international meetings and conferences 
held to create an organisation of Asian-African journalists. 
The Asian-African Journalists Association set up its head 
office in Jakarta with another Indonesian journalist, 
Djawoto, as General Secretary. After Djawoto left Jakarta 
to take up a post as ambassador, J oesoef took over as 
Acting General Secretary, the position he held at the time 
of the military takeover in October 1965. Several employ-
ees of the AAJA were arrested and the organisation was 
soon compelled to transfer its head office elsewhere. 
Joesoef remained free and continued to work as a 
journalist until 1968 when he was arrested along with 
many others in a sweep against journalists said to have 
'infiltrated' the 'new order' media. He remained in deten-
tion without trial for seven years, and spent most of that 
time in Salemba Prison, Jakarta. 
After his release, he was unable to return to journalism, 
one of the many professions strictly closed to ex-prisoners. 
So, together with Hasyim Rachman, also an ex-prisoner, 
he eventually set up Hasta Mitra. 
Joesoefs arrest in October this year followed in the 
wake of renewed pressures exerted by the authorities on 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer for having given a lecture at the 
University of Indonesia in September. Joesoefs son, Verdi, 
one of four students being held responsible for convening 
the meeting at which Pramoedya spoke, was also arrested, 
and held for several days (see separate item). 
All attempts to meet him by members of his family and 
by representatives of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute who 
wish to act on his behalf, have so far been unsuccessful. 
Nothing is therefore known about the reasons for his deten-
tion nor about his state of health. There is considerable 
concern on the latter question as he has a serious heart con-
dition and suffered severely from this during his earlier 
period of detention. 
Joesoef was spotlighted in The Times weekly " Prisoner 
of Conscience" column on 17 November 1981. 
Appeals for his immediate release should be addressed to: 
President Suharto 
Istana Negara 
Jalan Veteran 
Jakarta 
General Norman Sasono, Commander 
KO DAM V /Jaya 
(Jakarta Military Command) 
Jalan Perwira, Jakarta 
At the demonstration 
Embassy. 
outside the Indonesian Please make your concern about Joesoef known too to the 
Indonesian Embassy in your country. 
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DEMONSTRATION AGAINST BOOK-BURNING IN INDONESIA 
10,000 copies of Bumi Manusia (This Earth of Mankind) 
and Anak Semua Bangsa (Child of All Nations), the two 
novels by Pramoedya Ananta Toer which were banned in 
Indonesia on 19 May this year, were burnt in Jakarta on 22 
October, on the orders of the Attorney-General. 
In protest against this new act of barbarism, demonstra-
tions were organised outside the Indonesian embassies in 
London and The Hague on Tuesday, 27 October. The Lon-
don demonstration, called at very short notice, with nearly 
forty people present, was attended by Salman Rushdie, the 
Indian writer who had just been awarded the Booker Prize 
for Literature, for his novel Midnight's Children. Josephine 
Pullein-Thompson, General Secretary of English-PEN, and 
George Theiner, Deputy Editor of INDEX on Censorship, 
also attended, together with members of TAPOL, the 
Malaysia and Singapore students' association, FUEMSSO, 
the Philippines Support Group, the Ad Hoc Group for 
Democracy in Thailand and the British Campaign for an 
Independent East Tim or. 
Letters protesting against the book-burning were handed 
in to the Embassy by Salman Rushdie and by representatives 
ofTAPOL, English-PEN and INDEX on Censorship. 
Not The First Time Books have been Burned 
Tempo reports (14 November 1981) that in fact book-
bumings are nothing new in Indonesia. Susandi, a spokesman 
of the Attorney-General's Office, is quoted as saying that 
books previously burned include Atheist by Achdiat K. 
Mihard.ia, and the defence pleas of student defendants tried 
during 1979. Not only books, he boasted. "We also burned 
many copies of the Tampomas cassette." (This included a 
song considered as being offensive to Mrs Suharto, the 
President's wife. TAPOL). Susandi complained that the 
foreign press had got it wrong about the number of Pram-
oedya books burned. The impression being created is that 
Indonesia is a country unfamiliar with civilisation, partic-
ularly as the number of books burned is given as 10,000. In 
truth, according to the Attorney-General's Office, it was 
972. Less uncivilised because fewer copies were burned? Yet, 
now we know that book-burning is a regular practice in 
Indonesia. All we can say is that it is a great pity we didn't 
know this when we demonstrated outside the Indonesian 
Embassy on 27 October. Our protest would certainly have 
included all these other victims of cultural barbarity. 
Susandi acknowledged that the book-burning had 
aroused protest abroad. "We don't care about that. We are 
consistently implementing the people's sovereignty." The 
books, he said, were burned in compliance with a decision 
of the People's Consultative Assembly banning dissemina-
tion of Communist-Marxist-Leninist teachings. 
Tempo adds that the foreign protest referred to is pro-
bably the letter published in the international press, signed 
by 28 writers from 14 countries, protesting against the ban 
on Pramoedya's books. "Almost all the signatories are well-
known people," writes Tempo, "and they do not come 
from any .one particular (political) stream. It is not yet pos-
sible to determine the effect of this letter on Indonesia's 
name abroad. What is certain is that it has had a major 
impact for the name of Pramoedya." 
At the demonstration outside the Indonesian Embassy. 
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Letters of Protest 
From Salman Rushdie ... 
To Whom It May Concern : 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer is Indonesia's finest living novelist. 
His books This Earth of Mankind and A Child of All 
have led both Dutch and Indonesian critics to describe him 
as a possible Nobel Prizewinner. 
From 1965 to 1979, 'Pramoedya was jailed by the Indone-
sian Government, mostly on Buru Island, a sort of Far 
Eastern version of South Africa's Robben Island. Although 
he has now been released, he is the victim of continual 
police harassment and interrogation. 
In May 1981, his two acclaimed novels were banned. He is 
at present forbidden to leave Jakarta without permission, 
and cannot leave lndonsia at all, although he has in the 
past been encouraged to go into permanent exile abroad. 
Now comes the news that the Indonesian authorities have 
just carried out an anto-da-fe in which 10,000 copies of 
Pramoedya's books were burned. 
The persecution and banning of writers and their work 
creates constant - and necessary - indignation and 
outrage when the persecutors are geographically close to 
ourselves. It should arouse equal anger when it takes 
place far away. 
By burning books, the Indonesian Government has revealed 
something very ugly about itself to the world. It has placed 
itself in a long and ignoble tradition among whose dark 
luminaries are the Spanish Inquisition and the Nazis. 
]n this of all years, when Elias Canetti's prophetic novel 
Auto-da-Fe has been honoured by the Nobel Prize, I hope 
that many writers, publishers and readers will wish - as I 
do - to condemn all those who stifle freedom of expression 
and build bonfires out of the precious fuel of the printed 
word; and to protest against the persecution of Pramoedya 
Ananta Toer. 
From Francis King, President of the English 
Centre of PEN ... 
I am writing on behalf of the English Centre of PEN. 
We understand that Mr Pramoedya Ananta Toer is being 
harassed by the authorities, that his books have been burned 
and his publisher imprisoned. 
We deeply regret that this should be done in a country 
whose treatment of the creative artist we had begun to 
respect, and we ask that our fellow writer and PEN member 
should be allowed to write in peace and that his publisher 
should be released from prison. 
George Theiner (INDEX), Carmel Budiardjo (TAPOL) and 
Salman Rushdie, at the entrance to the Indonesian Embassy 
in London. 
From INDEX on Censorship 
We have heard with dismay that the distinguished Indo-
nesian author Pramoedya Ananta Toer, only recently re-
leased after 14 years of detention, is again being subjected 
to harassment and that his books have been banned by the 
authorities. We are also most concerned about reports 
that a large quantity of the books have actually been 
burned in Djakarta. 
Our organisation was founded 10 years ago with the aim 
of defending the freedom of writers and scholars everywhere 
in the world, regardless of nationality, race or politics. We 
therefore appeal to you to convey our protest at the treat-
ment meted out to Pramoedya Ananta Toer to your govern-
ment who will, we hope, see fit to lift the ban on his works 
and the restrictions on him and his publisher. 
Hugh Lunghi 
Director 
"No Culture Treaty With Bookburners". The demonstra-
tion at the Indonesian Embassy, The Hague, 27 October 
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HOW SUHARTO SUBVERTED CONFRONTATION 
So now it has come from the horse's mouth - the 
' story of how General Suharto, in close collaboration 
with General Ali Murtopo, subverted the Sukarno 
government's policy of confrontation with Malaysia. 
For a regime that rests its claim to legitimacy so 
firmly on the use of the anti-subversion laws, the 
shamelessness with which the story of Suharto's own 
act of subversion has now come to light is surely one 
of the great ironies of contemporary Indonesian 
history. 
For Suharto has now explained that soon after he 
was appointed Deputy Commander of the Dwikora 
Operation (the 'Dual-Command' Operation set up in 
early 1965 by Sukarno to implement the policy of 
confrontation with Malaysia), he secretly initiated 
approaches with the help of a few officers to bring 
confrontation to an end. 
"If it is true," asks Tempo (22 August 1981) in a 
detailed report on the events leading to reconciliation 
between Indonesian and Malaysia, "that the Army at 
the time fully supported President Sukarno's policy 
of confrontation, why was it that secret initiatives 
were taken by people within the Army leadership to 
bring about reconciliation?" The answer to this 
question was given in a speech by President Suharto 
at a ceremony held in August this year to mark the 
15th anniversary of the end of confrontation, inci-
dentally the first time the event has ever been 
publicly celebrated. Suharto said: 
If confrontation had not been speedily ended, our 
two kindred peoples would have fallen into the 
communist strategy trap. The Army leadership 
DEFEND PEASANTS AND 
TAKE THE CONSEQUENCES! 
Lawyers who defend peasants are more and more taking the 
risk of being charged themselves on totally spurious grounds. 
Two instances have come to light recently in East Java. 
Guilty Verdict Despite Evidence from Almost All Witnesses 
In the first case, a "barefoot" lawyer, Umardani, who took 
up the case of hundreds of peasants in Blitar, East Java was 
charged in court with having 'misappropriated funds' from 
his clients. Although all 42 peasants testifying at the irial 
vehemently denied this, he was found guilty and sentenced 
to 1 ~ years. The only witness to testify against the lawyer 
was a military officer. 
The land dispute concerns 240 hectares of land in the 
villages of Madongan and Karangrejo which were seized by 
the authorities in 1966, shortly after the military takeover. 
The peasants received a total of 7 hectares "in compensa-
tion" plus meaningless payments which anyhow lost their 
value altogether with the currency devaluation later that 
year. The peasants refrained from claiming their land 
back at the time out of fear they would be branded as 
was afraid that if confrontation continued to be 
intensified all the best troops of our Armed Forces 
would hav~ had to confront Malaysia, thus making 
Indonesia 'empty'. This could have been utili~ed 
by the PKI to realise its proposal for the format10n 
of a Fifth Force. 
This secret betrayal began as early as May 1965 with 
the launching of Suharto's own Operasi Khusus 
(Special Operation) and the dispatch of a secret mili-
tary mission to Malaysia, led by General (then 
Lieutenant-Colonel) Ali Murtopo. Ali Murtopo who 
was Suharto's First Assistant for Combat Operations 
in KOSTRAD, the Army's Strategic Command of 
which Suharto was then commander, was appointed 
'Project Officer' of this Special Operation. 
All this was happening at a time when virtually all 
organised political activity in Indonesia was being 
directed towards supporting Sukarno's policy of Con-
frontation. Men and women who, in their enthusiasm 
for this policy, went to the Halim air base outside 
Jakarta in late September for para-military training as 
'confrontation volunteers', have spent years in prison 
for 'subversion.; their presence at Halim made it 
appear as if they were in some way involved in the 
so-called 'Untung abortive coup' against the Army 
leadership. Some are still in prison, serving long sen-
tences or under sentence of death for this, not to 
mention the hundreds of thousands who were killed 
in the slaughter which followed in the wake of the 
coup which really happened and which was clearly of 
Suharto's own making. 
'PKI'. Their living conditions deteriorated sharply as they 
watched the seized lands producing profitable coffee crops 
for a private company. Some of tlie land was.being used for 
clove cultivation by the local military command. Aggrieved 
by this injustice, they asked Umardani to help them get 
their land back. They each contributed Rp 5,000 to cover 
his expenses and this is the money he is now said to have 
missappropria ted. 
When the verdict was announced in court, Umardani was 
so angry that he threw a chair at the judges and when this 
missed, he attacked them with a wooden block. "I was 
driven so mad by that unjust and very damaging verdict 
that I didn't know what I was doing," Umardani told a 
Tempo journalist afterwards in his cell. 
While he sits out the last two months of his sentence, 
having already spent one year and four months in deten-
tion, Umardani intends to appeal against the verdict. But 
he now faces new charges because of his outburst in court. 
(Tempo, 5 September, 1981) 
Lawyer Handed Over to KOPKAMTIB 
In the second case, Franz Gunawan, who took up the case 
of ten peasants in the village of Manggis, Kediri District, has 
been handed over to the LAKSUSDA, the regional 
Continued on page 16 
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FORMER GOVERNOR OF WEST IRIAN INTERVIEWED BY T APOL 
Eliezer Bonay, the man whom the Indonesian government first appointed governor of West Irian in May 1963, escaped 
from West Irian to Papua New Guinea in 19 79. He went to Sweden in June 1981, having been forced to go there against 
his will, and is now living there as a political refugee. 
Eliezer Bonay was the leader of the West Papuan pro-independence party, Pama at the time Indonesia took over 
formal administration of the country in 1963. In an interview with Carmel Budiardjo of T APOL, he spoke of his exper-
iences as governor, and later as a political refugee in Papua New Guinea. Two other Papuan refugees, D. Kafiar and 
Christopher Waney, also took part in the interview which took pla~e at the hostel for political refugees in Flen, Sweden, 
on 19 September 1981. The first part is published below. The rest will be published in our next issue. 
At the time of Indonesia's takeover of West Papua, you 
were, I believe, very much involved in the independence 
movement there. Please describe the background and the 
developments following the Indonesian takeover. 
Before the New York Agreement was signed, on 15th 
August 1962, preparations were under way in West Papua 
New Guinea for the granting of independence in 1970. At 
the time I was acting Chairman of the Partai Nasional 
(Pama). Like other nations in the world, we too wanted 
independence. For 12 years, there had been hostility be-
tween Holland and Indonesia over the future of West Papua 
but neither country had firm grounds to decide the issue in 
their favour. During discussions in New York'that led to the 
New York Agreement of 1962, the Papuan people were 
never involved. If they had been involved, the outcome 
would have been quite different. True, both Indonesian and 
Dutch delegations took Papuans with them to the UN but 
they were just sent off with pocket-money for sight-seeing, 
and were never involved in the discussions. Nicholas Jouwe 
went with the Dutch delegation and Silas Papare went with 
the Indonesians. I wasn't there at all. 
When the New York Agreement emerged, the Papuan 
people believed they would have the chance to exercise 
their right to self-determination but this never happened 
despite that international agreement. 
How did it come about that you were appointed Indo-
nesia's first governor of their new province? 
The decision to appoint me was taken by President Suharto. 
The Indonesians knew I was acting chairman of Pama, a 
party that was in favour of independence, so they thought: 
"Let's get hold of the man who has led the struggle for 
independence. If we appoint him governor, the matter will 
be solved." They thought that if I became governor, I 
would forget all about independence. 
I never wanted to become governor but they forced me 
to accept. I had never dreamed of any such thing. I rejected 
their offer. I didn't want to be used by them. I said this to 
de Freitas, the official from the Indonesian Foreign Minis-
try who came to tell me I had been selected by Sukarno 
for the job. When I turned it down, he said I would have 
three days to re-consider. But two days later, he came to 
see me again and pressed me to accept. When I refused 
again, he threatened me, saying I would be killed and 
others would be killed as well. When he said this, I knew of 
course that we in Pama would continue to struggle for in-
dependence during the transition period (up to 1969). But 
what about others? If the killings took place as threatened, 
they might stop thinking altogether of fighting for a Free 
Papua. So in the end, I had to accept. 
Some people think that I began to oppose Indonesia 
only after I was dismissed as governor. That is completely 
untrue. I always opposed the Indonesian takeover and 
favoured complete independence. 
What were your experiences 'during your time as governor? 
At first, I believed that the Papuan people would have the 
right to decide their fate in 1969 in accordance with the 
New York Agreement [which provided for the holding of 
a referendum called an "Act of Free Choice" - C.B.]. But 
as soon as the Indonesians arrived in our country, totally 
unexpected things began to happen. There were numerous 
brutalities, thefts, torture, maltreatment, many things that 
had not happened before. People were arrested in many 
different places: the prisons everywhere were full. Even 
under Sukarno such things were happening. It became 
especially bad after 1965. 
Weren't you, as governor, able to do anything to prevent 
this, or to raise problems with the government? 
No. They ran everything themselves. There was an institu-
tion of provincial leadership in those days called the Panca 
Tunggal (Five-in-One) consisting of the four Armed Forces 
chiefs besides the governor, and the governor was nothing 
more than a puppet. Later, after 1965, the system came 
to be known as the Muspida. All decisions were taken col-
lectively by the Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs together 
with the Public Prosecutor. In all regions, the Armed Forces 
commanders took the decisions, but this was particularly 
the case in West Irian which was then covered by an inter-
national agreement, the New York Agreement, and was 
therefore treated differently from other regions. 
How did Indonesian officials who were sent to West Papua 
behave? 
I should explain that during the time of confrontation be-
tween Holland and Indonesia, the Dutch government order-
ed their people to leave for home, taking only their clothes 
and leaving their household goods behind, because they 
would get compensation from the government. When the 
Indonesian came, they took literally everything, cassettes, 
television sets, even air-conditioners firmly installed in walls. 
All of them, officials and soldiers, behaved in the same way. 
Our people looked on, and laughed to themselves, thinking: 
"Is this how they are going to run things here, taking down 
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mirrors, wall fixtures , dismantling everything and taking it 
all away?" 
Was there nothing you could do to stop this? 
As I said just now, I was nothing more than a puppet. 
When were you dismissed? And why? 
I held the position for 19 months, from May 1963 until 
September 1964. I didn't agree with measures that were 
being taken at the time, but my dismissal came very sud-
denly and I wasn't told the reason. When I went to Jakarta, 
I asked Subandrio (then Foreign Minister): "What did I do 
wrong?" but I never got any reply . I was transferred to the 
Interior Ministry in Jakarta, as a senior official seconded to 
the Ministry. It was quite impossible to raise anything there 
about what was happening in West Papua. I had been "put 
on ice", and I had no function at all, so in 1966, I returned 
home. To use the expression, I had been "pushed aside". 
When I returned home, I was no longer a government 
official. Then I became involved in political activities. I did 
many things but maybe I'll be able to tell you about them 
some other time. 
During that time,was any regional development taking 
place? 
Nothing really, except in the field of education. Thousands 
of Papuans were taken to Indonesia for education. There 
was no physical development going on at all. 
Did you feel that injustices were being committed? 
Oh yes, even as early as 1962 and 1963. People were already 
being forced to make statements declaring that there should 
be no referendum in 1969. The Indonesians used these 
statements, saying, "Look, it's not necessary to hold a ref-
erendum." 
How did the Indonesians get people to sign statements like 
this? 
They gave them things, took them to Jakarta, treated them 
well. Students, leaders in the community and others. Paid 
their . way, wrote out statements for them to sign. They 
used refined methods, not threats. 
Then, when things changed ... 
Oh, nothing changed. In 1964 there was still a governor but 
he too could do nothing. 
I mean when the military took power in Indonesia, when 
Sukarno lost power. 
Things got even worse. From 1963 till 1969, up to the time 
of the so-called "referendum" - in fact there never was any 
referendum - 30,000 people were murdered. All that hap-
pened up to 1969, particularly from the time of the people's 
rebellion in Manokwari, in 1965. They kidnapped people, 
one by one. Anyone under suspicion in the regions was 
killed. Many villages were bombed during a number of re-
bellions, in Manokwari, in Enarotali, and in many other 
places. Up to the time of the so-called "referendum" alone, 
8 
30,000 people were murdered. Then many more were killed 
after 1969, in 1975, then in later years. 
After the 'New Order' of Suharto was established, they ad-
opted a different policy, didn't they? Whereas Sukarno had 
been saying no referendum was necessary because the 
people had already expressed their desire to be part of In-
donesia, Suharto decided that a referendum should take 
place. He presumably wanted to show the world how 
democratic thing were, didn't he? 
No referendum ever took place. 
VILLAGERS ~rn 
From a report by Henk de Mari in De Telegraaf, 11,12, and H~! 
"We publish only those stories that our reporter noted down i11 
from the lips of people who were involved themselves. who r:~' 
saw it happening, or who immediately afterwards happened 1il 
to talk to the survivors. And further. only the stories of wil- ~Ii 
nesses whose reliability is acceptable according lo represen- 11!> 
tatives of the Roman Catholic and Protestant missions . ·:~; 
"The mass murders are said to have taken place on the west i'iol 
coast of the island of Biak in June 1970. What the immediate ·rn1 
case was is not immediately clear. Members of the Organi- i~m 
sasi Papua Merdeka are said to have fired al Indonesian sol- ~~n 
diersTntfle iungle on the west coast. _In the process. ten · !!:,! 
soldiers are said Lo have been killed. An Indonesian patrol ~I ~ 
of 50 red-beret and green-beret soldiers then went on a pu-
1111
al 
nitive expedition. · 
"The kampongs of Wusdori and Kridori. built on piles along ~loot 
the beach. were visited by the patrol. The villagers knew '\\ei 
the patrol was coming and they fled. not because they had in lhi 
any way beE>n in \' Ol\·ed in the OPM but because they were. as · ~~· 
is usuall:• the case. afraid of Indonesian soljiers. It often lli~n 
happens. even to this day. that troops misbehave: . the\' rape ~ia~ 
women. kill pigs. and demand food and drink without payment. :11!l 
"When the patrol reached the two kampongs, a.II they found illt,t 
I am referring to that "Act of Free Choice". 
There was never any Act of Free Choice either. They them-
selves said quite bluntly that it would not be organised ac-
cording to international practice. But it wasn't even organ-
ised according to Indonesian practice. Neither method was 
used. Indonesia's method of musyawarah* was not used, it 
simply wasn't used. 
In 1968, the West Irian regional assembly (DPRD) adop-
ted a decision demanding that the method of ' one person, 
one vote' should be used. The government rejected this and 
the DPRD was dissolved. 
There was no musyawarah at all. The government simply 
appointed 1025 tribal chiefs, most of them illiterate people. 
They set up a new council, the Dawan Musyawarah Pepera 
(pepera is the abbreviation for penentuan pendapat rakyat, 
or 'determining the people's opinion'). And just imagine! 
Of these 1025 people, so many were chosen in Fak Fak, so 
(*) Musyawarah: consensus through consultation. 
TAPOL Bulletin~~ •. 
"e1 
many in Merauki, and so on. If there was supposed to have 
been a musyawarah, all these people should have met to-
gether, but that never happened. They all stayed in their 
own regions and voted in those places. And before voting 
took place, they were housed in pre-fabricated buildings 
brought especially from Jakarta (as if we don 't have enough 
time in West Papua!). Each of the groups of people stayed 
in their own regions where they were coa~hed on what to 
do and how to vote. They never all came together for any 
musyawarah. For a period of time before the 'act' was 
scheduled to take place, for two weeks beforehand , they 
llURDERED ... 
,Id 19October1974: 
~i 
n11 
were deserted huts . . . The patrol moved on witho'Jt destroyinr: 
anything. Next day. the villagers moved back . . . . 
"The rule is that when a patrol visits a Papuan kampong, 
all the villagers must report on the village square . Anyone 
failing to so is regarded as a member of the OPM and there-
fore an enemy The fact that the villagers had left when the 
patrol came turned them all into enemies . 
"After the villagers had been back for two davs. the soldiers 
returned and encircled the villages . All the inhabitants were 
driven to an open space between the two kampongs, and the 
men, 25 from Wusdori and 30 from Kridori, were forced lo 
dig a large hole .... That hole became their grave for they 
were all shot to death. The wome'n and children were forced 
to look on .. . . 
"The day after the mass murder, the soldiers came back 
with some 30 Papuans, presumably from neighbouring kam-
pongs. They were not known to the villagers of Wusdori and 
Kridori. The soldiers took the boats of the villagers they 
killed the day before and forced the 30 Papuans into the boats . 
Stones had been tied to their necks, and not far from the 
shore, the Papuans were thrown overboard and drowned . " 
Taken from: Tapol Bulletin No 8 January 1975. 
were isolated from society and told what to do. They were 
guarded by soldiers. One person only was chosen to speak, 
then all the others just said, yes, yes, yes. Voting took place 
in each of the regiqns. The people in Merauki knew nothing 
about what the people in Fak Fak were doing and so on. 
During that whole time, these people were not allowed 
to have contact with anyone, not even with their wives and 
children. The government used these emergency buildings 
so that everything could be controlled by the Army. 
Yet, the UN was willing to accept that? 
Yes. When I read the report made by Ortis Sanz [the UN 
observer of the "Act of Free Choice"] it was really strange, 
there were so many things he didn't even mention at all. 
There has never been any referendum in West Papua. If 
there had been, the people would have been able to decide. 
They would not have needed to rebel. And don't forget, be-
fore the 'pepera', 30,000 people had already been killed. 
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Then afterwards, rebellions took place everywhere and 
many more were killed. 
(To Kafiar): What was happening at the time in Jayapura? 
I was still going to senior secondary school at the time , and 
I already began to take part in political activities. we were 
very active in the schools, supporting the rebellion led by 
Fritz Awom in Manokwari in 1965, and elsewhere. From 
1965 onwards, people all over the country were making 
preparations for an act of self-determination. Many small 
organisations were set up , supporting the principle of self-
determination. School-pupils were very much involved in 
all this. Everyone was in favour of an act of self-determina-
tion. But then, things like this were not allowed and many 
school pupils were arrested and thrown into prison. Then 
some of us set up Petanah (Pembela Tanahair - Defence 
of the Motherland) and took over these school organisa-
tions because they had been suspended and prohibited 
from doing anything. 
Did you all agree that a plebiscite should take place? And 
that you should oppose joining Indonesia? 
We concentrated on explaining to people that the method 
used should be one person, one vote . In support of this de-
mand, we organised a demonstration in Jayapura on 11th 
April, 1969 just before the plebiscite was to take place. We 
wanted to tell the regional government that this principle 
should be used. We planned to march to the DPRD 
building, demanding the right to self-determination. But 
this wasn't possible. They brought out panzers and other 
things and prevented the demonstration from taking 
place. Some of the leaders were arrested on the spot and 
thrown into prison. 
How many people took part? 
Very many indeed. Not only students, also government 
employees, people from all strata of the community. 
(Bonay): It was the largest demonstration that had ever 
taken place in Jayapura. The demand raised was limited to 
the principle of one person, one vote. It was all very 
orderly. People were just walking in a very orderly fashion, 
with leaflets and posters. That's all. 
(Kafiar): I personally didn't take part in the demonstration 
as I had already joined the guerrilla movement and I had a 
special task to do at the time. 
Many organisations had been set up to demand a proper 
plebiscite but they were not allowed to function, ·so 
nothing was achieved by that movement. What the Indo-
nesians did was just bring some tribal chiefs together, and 
they made sure these people would give their vote to In-
donesia. 
Is it true that the government was saying that anyone not 
agreeing that West Papua should become part of Indonesia 
was a traitor or a Dutch puppet? 
(Bonay): Yes, but not only that. They were beaten and 
maltreated too. 
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(Kafiar) : Yes , and some of those who didn 't want West 
Papua to become part of Indonesia disappeared altogether. 
In June 1971 , I was arrested in Jayapura and detained in 
a police cell. There were 15 of us altogether. Ten were re-
leased and five of us remained in detention without trial 
till 1972. Then, after being held for a year, we were tried 
and each of us got sentences of between 2 and 2~ years. 
After the trial , we were transferred from the police cell in 
Jayapura to the prison in Abepura . Then early in August 
1972 (I think it was on the 2nd August), one of us was 
kidnapped. 
Even after he had been tried? 
Yes, even after being tried and sentenced. His name was 
Martin Luther Waring. He completely disappeared. Later 
on, we tried to trace him with the help of the security 
section of the Social Institute (Lembaga Kemasarakatan) 
but we were never able to discover anything about what 
happened to him. 
(Bonay): I would like to add something here. One of the 
reasons Indonesia gave in 1969 for holding the pepera in 
the way they did was that the Papuan people are still ignor-
ant and don't know how to vote. Yet, the funny thing is 
that in 1971 , these same people had to vote in the general 
elections. As a matter of fact, the people had already par-
ticipated earlier in elections, under the Dutch. These elec-
tions took place in 1961, for a Papuan Council. In 1969 
Indonesia said that they were too ignorant, illiterate, and 
then two years later, they were all compelled to vote . This 
time, it was in the Indonesian elections. Strange, isn't it? 
(To be continued) 
OPM OFFENSIVE: TWO PLANES SHOT DOWN 
OPM troops have launched a series of offensives in the past 
few months near and inside Jayapura, the capital of West 
Irian, according to OPM sources abroad. The first attack 
was on 1 August , in the Paui District, 13 kms from the 
capital. More than 250 Indonesian troops were killed; the 
OPM lost 51 dead. 
On 9 September, OPM troops attacked the prison in 
Abepura where OPM prisoners are being held. They did not 
release anyone but caused a lot of damage. According to 
Tempo (24 October) which carried a long report about re-
newed military activity in West lrian, "the prison warders 
fled and the attackers destroyed the prison offices." 
(Tempo as well as AFP both give the date for this attack as 
9 October.) 
On 14 October, OPM troops attacked a lumber com-
pany, PT Hanura, on Holtekan Highway, taking 50 host-
ages. According to Tempo and AFP, they were later re-
leased. The OPM reports that when Indonesian troops were 
dropped in the region after the kidnapping, their troops 
shot down a Dakota/Merpati plane. 
The third major encounter took place in Genyem/ 
Nimboran and Ceycloop, near the border with Papua New 
Guinea, and on this occasion too, according to OPM 
sources, a Hercules plane was shot down. AFP also confirms 
that a Hercules was "attacked from the surrounding hills 
near (Sentani) airport'', and quotes Indonesian military 
spokesmen as saying that "a massive military operation" is 
underway from their side to deal with the new offensive. 
In a fourth encounter, on 7 November, in the Arso/ 
Jayapura district, 20 Indonesian soldiers were killed, accor-
ding to OPM, who themselves sustained severe injuries 
among their troops. 
The AFP report mentions an incident not referred to in 
the OPM reports, namely that several young women, 
"hoisted the OPM flag in the yard of the governor's office 
(in Jayapura) a few days before the attack (on Abepura 
prison) occurred". (Sources: Representative of the National 
(De Facto) Govt. of West PNG abroad, 22 November 1981; 
Tempo, 24 October 1981, and AFP, 13 October 1981.) 
Number of OPM Prisoners 
OPM sources abroad have provided the following break-
down of OPM prisoners being held in the period June-
August 1981: 
Jayapura 141 Manokwari 97 
Biak 52 Nabire 43 
Seroei 34 Wamena 123 
VILLAGERS MALTREATED 
Sorong 16 
Enarotali 64 
Merauki 94 
From August to October this year, a large number of people 
in the district of Merauke left their villages and went Into 
the jungle to join the OPM forces . As a reprisal, the Army 
arrested some 500 people and subjected them to the 
following forms of treatment: 
-they were each forced to swallow bullets; 
- pistols were thrust into their mouths and held there for 
3045 minutes; 
- men and women were forced to drink their own urine ; 
- women and girls were forced to strip naked and were 
repeatedly raped; 
- those considered to be OPM leaders were then kidnapped 
(presumably this means taken to unknown destinations and 
made to disappear, Ed. TAPOL), while the remainder are 
still being held in underground cells. 
(Source : OPM representative .abroad, 22 November 1981) 
Continued from page 14 
The Faculty's Student Senate was also disbanded on 
19th October, "in order", according to the Dean of 
the Faculty, Professor Tobias Subekti, "to prevent a 
repetition of student activities that are damaging to 
the Faculty and the University". Students' reaction to 
this is, to quote Bunga, Deputy Chairman of the Student 
Consultative Body, as follows: "We will certainly resist 
but don't ask us yet what form this will take." (Sources: 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 October, and Tempo, 
24th October 1981.) 
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IN MEMORY OF SIAUW GIOK TJHAN 
When Siauw Giok Tjhan died on 20 November, we in 
TAPOL lost a close and dedicated friend and supporter. 
Writing so soon after the news of his death, it is dif-
ficult to off er an assessment of his many, varied contri-
butions to political, social and cultural life in Indonesia 
since the time he first became involved, almost fifty 
years ago, as an activist in the Partai Tionghua Indonesia 
(Indonesian Chinese Party). What stands out most vividly 
in my mind at this moment are the many meetings I had 
with him and Ibu Siauw, discussing the things we should 
be doing to help those in Indonesia who are suffering 
from the injustices of the present regime. 
Bung Siauw himself spent 13 years, from 1965 to 1978, 
as a political prisoner without trial. For the first ten of 
these years, he was held in Salemba Prison, Jakarta, then he 
was allowed home for health reasons but spent another 
three years under house arrest then under town arrest until 
he was finally "returned to society" on 1May,1978. Shortly 
afterwards, he went to Holland for medical treatment and 
remained there until his death. 
For me, Bung Siauw was one of those few, cherished 
friends among Indonesians living abroad who remained 
totally committed to helping his friends and colleagues 
back home. He was an activist in the finest sense of the 
word. He remained in constant contact with his many 
friends at home and abroad. He assiduously read current 
political publications not just as an academic exercise but 
in order to respond - often with anger and indignation, 
never with cynicism - and to share his responses with 
others. He was always doing things himself and encour-
aging others to act. And, despite his failing health, he 
spent much of his time, especially since the anti-Chinese 
racist attacks in Java late last year, speaking to Indonesian 
students abroad in many parts of Europe about the prob-
lem closest of all to his heart, the realisation of proper in-
tegration of the Chinese in Indonesia which is the central 
them of his last published work, Lima Jaman (Five 
Periods). * It is symbolic of the substance and style of the 
last few years of his life that he died soon after collapsing 
as he was on his way to a student meeting in Leiden to talk 
about this very topic. 
One of his last efforts only a few days before his death 
was to propose to us that Amnesty International should be 
urged to include in its forthcoming Campaign on Disap-
pearances the cases of hundreds of thousands of people 
who disappeared in Indonesia during and after the mas-
sacres that occurred in the wake of the military takeover in 
late 1965. This was a matter he had taken up with TAPOL 
nearly two years ago, soon after reading that the UN 
Human Rights Commission had set up a Working Group on 
Disappeared Persons. How could such a campaign be limited 
to people who were disappearing now? What about all the 
disapperances in Indonesia since 1965? Was it not necessary 
to insist that the Indonesia government should be made 
publicly accountable for them? These were the reasons why 
he urged TAPOL to take up the issue, and in doing so, he 
supplied us with information about the disappearance of 
many people and was largely responsible for the detailed 
material we published in TAPOL Bulletin No 39 (May 
1980). Just imagine, if all Indonesians abroad made such 
concrete contributions to our work (and there's no denying 
that many people know just as much as he did), our 
bulletins could appear at twice the length and still not 
reproduce all the material made available to us. 
My own last meeting with him was at his home in Ams-
terdam, less than two weeks before his death. He and Ibu 
Siauw had just returned from a visit to their children and 
grandchildren in China, during which he had spent a lot of 
time, much to his dismay, in hospital, having medical 
check-ups. It could well be that the doctors told him then 
that he didn't have much longer to live, but to me he was as 
lively and welcoming as ever. We spent the evening with 
several Dutch and Indonesian friends watching some films 
about Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Jacob Piry and other ex-
tapols in Jakarta, and discussing what to do to help them. 
Bung Siauw always exuded optimism and his optimism 
was very contagious. There was no trace of bitterness or 
cynicism in him, only deep sincerity and down-to-earth 
commitment. Having had the chance of meeting him often 
during the past three years, it is not easy to contemplate 
work in future without Bung Siauw. As some friends have 
said, when someone like that dies, the only way to mourn 
is to redouble your own efforts. That is absolutely true but 
it doesn't lessen the pain and sadness of losing such a good 
and invaluable friend. 
Carmel Budiardjo 
* Lima Jaman, published by Yayasan Teratai in May 1981 
is available (in Indonesia) from Stichting lnformatie Indo-
nesia, Postbus 4098, 1009 AB Amsterdam. 25 guilders 
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EASTTIMOR 
AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT NYERERE 
ON EAST TIMOR l'he UN Decolonisation Committee adopted a resolution on 
9th November which again stresses that the East Timorese 
people should be allowed to exercise their right to self-
determination. It also expresses deep concern at reports of 
famine in East Timor. The resolution calls upon Portugal, 
the East Timorese people and Indonesia to co-operate with 
the UN to enable the right of self-determination to be 
exercised. 
We have always worked together at the UN or non-
aligned nations' conferences. We are happy that Indo-
nesia has always been in support of our anti-apartheid 
and anti-colonialist movements. We hope that Indonesia 
will refrain from trading with South Africa, no matter 
how attractive the offer. Some nations claim that trade 
and politics are two different things. Young nations, 
however, cannot afford to be cynical. 
Voting on the resolution was 58 for, 40 against, and 42 
abstentions. Last year, voting on a similar resolution was 58 
for, 36 against and 46 abstentions. President Nyerere, at a press conference inJakarta on 
12th October 1981, according to Antara News Agency. 
The following correspondence has appeared in The Times 
on the question of East Tim or: 
During his State Visit to Indonesia, President Nyerere of 
Tanzania said his country would continue to support UN 
resolutions on East Timor though it would no longer 
sponsor them "out of respect for Indonesia". At the same 
time, he spent the major part of his visit discussing ways of 
strengthening the economic ties between the two countries. 
If this is not an example of regarding trade and politics as 
two different things, then what is? To accept "anti-
colonialist support" over South Africa from a country en-
gaged in its own colonial war of aggression is surely just 
about as cynical as you can get. 
THE TIMES TUESDAY NOVEMBER 3 1981 
East Timor invasion 
From Lord Avebury 
Sir, Evidence indicating that 
Britain and her allies, while 
making the right noises in public 
about the right of the people of 
East Timar to self-determination, 
were at the same time secretly 
encouraging the Indonesians in 
their aggression against that 
country has been availlable for 
, some time. That such charges 
have now been made on Portu-
guese television (The Times, 
October 13) therefore comes as no 
surprise. 
On December 10 last year, I 
initiated a debate in the House of 
Lords on this very matter. I 
referred to a secret letter from 
the British Ambassador to Indo-
nesia to the Foreign Office of July 
1975, the text of which had been 
published in a book which 
appeared a few weeks earlier in 
Australia. 
As far as the Ambassador's 
advice, to "keep our head~ down 
and avoid siding against the 
Indonesian Government ' ', is con-
cerned, this has indeed happened 
as is apparent from Britain's 
voting record on the annual 
resolutions tabled at United 
Nations General Assemblies. 
Apart from one occasion in 19751 Britain has repeatedly abstainea 
on resolutions calling for an act 
of self-determination in East 
Timor, despite the Government's 
stated belief that such an act has 
not yet taken place, and its 
declarations on a number of 
occasions that Britain does not 
recognize Indonesia's integration 
of East Timor. 
Meanwhile, news of a new 
offensive in East Timor has 
, recendy come from church 
, sources there and Indonl!sia. 
· Virtually the entire surviving male 
population is being conscril?ted in 
an operation aimed at forcing all 
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resistance fighters into the open. 
A report submitted in June this 
year by the East Timor regional 
assembly, whose members were , 
certainly appointed by the Indo-
nesian Government, details gross 
human rights violations by Indo-
nesian troops and widespread 
corruption and malpractices by 
Indonesian military personnel in 
charge of the economy. 
While I consider that it is still 
necessary to pursue the issue of 
Britain's past role concerning 
Indonesia's invasion, the most 
crucial issue today is for western 
governments, including our own, 
all of whom have close economic 
ties with Indonesia; to press for 
immediate withdrawal of Indo-
nesian troops from East Timor, 
and to work to create the 
necessary conditions for the 
people of that war-torn country to 
exercise their right to self-deter-
mination. 
Editor's Note 
A month before the Indonesian Charge d' Affaires' letter 
appeared in The Times, the Jakarta English-language daily, 
Indonesian Observer (6 October 1981) carried an AFP/ 
Antara report from Canberra about East Timor, the con-
cluding paragraphs of which are in stark contradiction with 
Tarmizi's disclaimers. They read: 
Yours faithfully, 
AVEBURY, 
House of Lords. 
A Foreign Affairs Department spokesman meanwhile said 
yesterday that the Ministry had instructed the Australian 
ambassador to Indonesia to seek details on Indonesia'~ present 
''pacification" campaign in East Timor. 
The campaign, known as "Operation Keamanan", * is aimed at 
rounding up remnants of the Fretilin forces. 
*Operation Keamanan or Security Operation is the Indonesian 
Army's .code name for the offensive referred to in Lord Avebury's 
letter. 
THE TIMES TUESDAY NOVEMBER 10 1981 
East Timor 
From the Indonesian Charge 
d'Affaires (a.i.) 
Sir, Lord Avebury in his letter 
(November 3) dramal'ises a so-
called "new offensive" in East 
Timar as if this were a fact. There 
is no truth whatsoever in his 
description of a quite normal 
military exercise, carried out as a 
matter of routine. 
Indonesia is a large country and 
it has to undertake military 
exercises to be ready to defend 
itself - manoeuvres such as are 
carried out in most countries. It 
so happens that, this year, Timor 
was chosen as the area in which 
the annual manoeuvres were 
staged. 
There is no true ground for 
Lord Avebury's statement that 
"virtually the entire surviving 
male population is being con-
scripted in an operation aimed at 
forcing all resistance fighters into 
the open". By usin1;t the emotive 
words "resistance fighters" he is 
trying to suggest that there is an 
opposition force. Nonsense - the 
people ·of. East Timor are tryi~ to 
work together to develop the-
country. 
A second implication is that 
Indonesian troops are incapable of 
carrying out their own military 
operation. If this were really the 
case then Indonesia would have 
collapsed durirtg the days in 
which it had to struggle for its 
independence. 
Yours sincerely, 
AGUS TARMIZI, 
Indonesian Embassy, 
38 Grosvenor Square, Wl . 
TAPOL Bulletin No 48 November 1981 
EAST TIMOR: PORTUGAL'S ROLE REVEALED 
The cynical collaboration of the Western powers in the 
criminal Indonesian annexation of East Timor has been 
further exposed by the leaking and subsequent release of a 
1,000-page secret government report in Lisbon last month. 
The report officially confirms claims made earlier in 
October on Portuguese television concerning the knowing 
complicity of the 1974-5 Portuguese government in the 
Indonesian takeover (see Jill Jolliffe, The Guardian, 12 and 
17 October, and John Torres, The Times, 13 and 14 
October). It is now clear that the Portuguese government 
wished to abandon--rather than discharge-its decolonis-
ation obligations concerning the East Timorese as soon as 
possible, leaving East Timor defenceless and helpless for 
the Indonesian takeover. To this end, Portugal together 
with the American, British and Australian governments held 
secret talks with Indonesia in 1974. (The Suharto regime 
made clear its annexationist intentions to the Western 
powers in 1974.) 
The latest revelations in Portugal confirm the sordid 
diplomatic betrayal of the East Timorese by the Western 
This photograph was sent to 
TAPOL in October. It shows a 
Fretilin prisoner being forced 
to stare at the sun until he goes 
blind. The sign on the hut 
reads: "Batugade Border Post". 
The photo, taken at great 
risk, was shot from a distance, 
and had to be enlarged for re-
production. The more distant 
figure in white is wearing a 
helmet and the position of his 
left arm suggests he is holding 
a weapon, though this is indis-
tinct against the background. 
Although the photo has 
worsened in quality with en-
largement, we decided to pub-
lish it, the only photo ever re· 
ceived from East Timor of an 
act of torture in progress. 
powers, already documented by Richard Walsh and George 
Munster in Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign 
Policy, 1969-197 S, published in defiance of an Australian 
government ban in November 1980. For example, a secret 
cable from the British Ambassador (in Indonesia) to the 
Foreign Office in July 1975 said in part: " ... it is in 
Britain's interest that Indonesia should absorb the territory 
as soon and as unobtrusively as possible ; and that if it 
comes to the crunch and there is a row in the United 
Nations, we should keep our heads down and avoid siding 
against the Indonesian government." 
In the light of the facts, the present Portuguese govern-
ment's vote in support of the recent UN resolution on East 
Tim or (see this Bulletin, page 12 ), like the British govern-
ment's vote of "abstention" inust be taken for what it is. 
Rhetoric and hypocrisy aside, nothing has changed since 
the 1974 betrayal in the Western powers' policy of com-
pliant acquiescence in the Indonesian takeover. Me1mwhile, 
the East Timorese victims of Western (and specifically 
Portuguese) complicity continue to suffer and die. 
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THE CHARTER OF 61: OPPOSITION OR COLLABORATION? 
On August 21, 1981 , a group of 61 "opponents" of the 
Suharto (New Order) regime, headed by erstwhile New Or-
der "hawk", H.R. Dharsono, issued a Charter to Uphold 
Law, Justice and the Sovereignty of the People in Accor-
dance with the Aims of the New Order. The signatories 
include such seemingly diverse figures as General A.H. 
Nasution, Ali Sadikin (former mayor of Jakarta), Ibrahim 
G. Zakir (a student leader tried with others in 1979 for 
"insult" ), Hoegeng (a former Police Chief), Mohamad 
Natsir (former Prime Minister) and Sjafruddin Prawir-
anegara (a leader of the 1958 PRRI CIA-backed rebellion 
against Sukarno.) Other critics of New Order "Justice", 
such. as human rights lawyers working with the Legal Aid 
Institute (LBH) are significantly absent. If nothing else, 
the Charter is a revealing symptom of the ideological and 
political hollowness of respectable 'Opposition' to the 
regime's practices . 
The Charter's fundamental demand is a return to the 
"purity" of the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila ideology. 
The signatories criticize the New Order for its deviations 
from these principles (Rule of Law and the five Pancasila 
principles : (1) Belief in God , (2) National Consciousness, 
(3) Humanism, (4) Social Justice, (5) Democracy). In 
addition, the Charter calls for the prohibition of 
"Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, Neo-Colonialism, 
Militarism, Feudalism, together with all forms of Auto-
cracy, Dictatorship, and Totalitarianism which conflict 
with the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution". It calls 
for an economic system "in accordance with the Panca-
sila and the 1945 Constitution, free from colonial domina-
tion, repression and exploitation by foreign capitalism or 
national capitalism in any form", and appeals for freedom 
of expression for individuals and organizations, for the 
abolition of corruption and for free elections. It rejects 
KOPKAMTIB and "all forms of military pacts and 
foreign military bases." 
There are two fundamental problems with all this. 
First, far from constituting a serious ideological or polit-
ical challenge to the system of ~uthoritarian domination 
and economic corruption of the Suharto regime, the 
Charter ignores the fundamental contradiction between its 
acceptance of the "Aims of the New Order" and its call for 
a return to the Pancasila principles and the 1945 Constitu-
tion. Such uncritical acceptance is predictable, however 
given the role of some of the signatories in supporting the 
Suharto regime's 1965-66 Coup and Massacre. In truth 
neither the 'Old Order' (Sukarno regime) nor the New 
Order has paid real attention to either Pancasila or the 
Constitution. Their principles are in practice merely 
empty noises whic_h the wielders of State power invoke 
to 'justify' their conduct, and which opponents use to 
criticize 'deviations' from these ideals. In using the 
empty ideology of Pancasila to 'criticize' the policies 
of the New Order, the Opposition is - wittingly or un-
wittingly - collaborating in the regime's abuse of power 
in the name of Pancasila, for its own ends. 
Second, the Charter's signatories fail to address the prob-
lem of (a) how a 'return ' to Pancasila and the 1945 Consti-
tution would suffice to abolish the evils of national and 
foreign capitalism, KOPKAMTIB, foreign alliances and 
bases etc.; and (b) what real-world alternatives for the pre-
vailing economic and State institutions the Pancasila ideolo-
gy provides. In truth the Pancasila consists of ideological 
abstractions, not realizable alternative social-political-
economic institutions. 
Far from constituting a serious alternative to the crim-
inal domestic and foreign policies of the Suharto regime, 
the Charter merely symbolizes the -intellectual and pol-
itical bankruptcy of its loyal - collaborationist -
"opposition". Fortunately opposition to New Order 
"Justice" is not confined to such 'respectable' , 'res-
ponsible' critics. 
FOUR STUDENTS EXPELLED: STUDENT 
SENATE DISBANDED 
Four students of the University of Indonesia's Faculty of 
Social Sciences have been expelled for 'engineering' the lec-
ture meeting in September at which Pramoedya Ananta 
Toer, the author, spoke about the role intellectuals. The 
Faculty's Student Senate has also been disbanded. 
The four students, Rafendi Djamin, Widi Krastawan, 
Verdi Jusuf (the son of Joesoef Ishak, see page 3), and 
Alexander Irwan, were under arrest for several days early 
in October. Pressure for their expulsion came from 
KOPKAMTIB but the Rector, Dr Mahar Mardjono was 
unwilling to comply, according to the Far Eastern 
Economic Review, and personally asked KOPKAMTIB 
Commander, Admiral Sudomo, for assurances that the 
matter be handled by the university because "he was 
upset by what he considered an infringement by the 
government of the autonomy of the university". 
The students were released soon afterwards. A few 
days later, the University Disciplinary Committee re-
commended that the students be expelled "for under-
mining the Rector's authority" and "undermining the 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution". The Rector 
issued his expulsion order on 19th October. 
Thus, the Rector had no interest in defending the 
students, only in defending what he considers to be 
"the university's autonomy", namely the chance to 
carry out the expulsion through university machinery 
rather than appearing to act on direct instructions 
from KOPKAMTIB. 
While this shadow-boxing was going on, the students 
were again summoned by KOPKAMTIB for interroga-
tions lasting six days. According to information made 
available to TAPOL by- independent sources, they were 
under pressure to admit that Pramoedya's lecture 
·~contained Marxist teachings" and to say who it was who 
first suggested that Pram be invited to speak. 
Continued on page 10 
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BRITISH INVESTMENTS IN INDONESIA INCREASING 
A large delegation of 60 British businessmen, "the largest 
ever to visit Indonesia", according to Indonesian officials, 
attended the second British-Indonesian Business Meeting on 
Trade and Investment in Jakarta, in October this year. The 
delegation was headed by Britain's Minister of Trade, Peter 
Rees. 
At a press conference before leaving Jakarta, Trade 
Minister Rees said he looked forward to a "large-scale 
expansion in Britan's trade with and investment in Indo-
nesia. British businesses are particularly interested in set-
ting up joint ventures in lndonesi11 and in the transfer of 
advanced technology, especially in communications and 
transport. 
A n"Iajor new advance for British capital in Indonesia is 
the joint venture to be set up between Dunlop, a company 
that has operated in Indonesia since 1928, and PT Intirub, 
the Indonesian state-owned rubber manufacturing company. 
The new plant, to be set up in Cilegon, West Java, at a cost 
of$ 150 million will be financed with assistance from the 
Commonwealth Development Coroporation. 
Other major British companies benefitting from expan-
ding commercial ties with Indonesia are the construction 
company, Balfour Beatty and British Insulated Callenders 
Cables (BICC). These two companies are currently involved 
Letters to the Editor 
Dear TAPOL, 
Thank you to those who responded to our request for 
letters. We look forward to receiving many more for 
the next issue. Additional information from you or 
I was very interested to read your item "US Green Berets in East 
Timor?" (TAPOL BULLETIN, No. 46, Jl!lY 1981, p.9). Since the 
December 197 5 US-backed Indonesian invasion, there have been 
persistent, periodical reports in the Australian (non-mainstream) 
press to this effect, along with reports of Australian and British 
"counter-insurgency" advisers (see, for example various items over 
the years in Nation Review, Tribune and East Timor News). 
In fact, as part of the global anti-communist drive of the 
Kennedy administration, American "counter-insurgency" "advisers" 
began operating in Indonesia (under the cover of the so-called "civic 
action" . programmes also practised in Latin America and Vietnam) 
as early.as 1963 (see T. Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 631-3; R. Mrazek, 
The United States and the Indonesian Military, Vol. 2, pp. 76-7; 
H'.. McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, p. 34). By this time, these 
"advisers" were already called Green Berets (see Sorensen). 
In the light of these facts, the presence of American Green 
Berets in East Timor would seem almost certain. As early as 1970, 
for example, American Green Berets were openly training Indo-
nesian troops in "counter-insurgency" and other "pacification" 
projects in both East and West Java (see P. Britton, Bulletin of 
Concerned Asian Scholars, July-Sept. 1975, p. 20; and M. Klare, in 
M. Caldwell (ed.), Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia, p. 270). 
Yours sincerely, 
(Professor) Bruce McFarlane 
Dept. of Politics, University of Adelaide. 
This reminds us to correct errors in the item to which Professor 
McFarlane is responding. The second sentence in the first para-
graph should read : "Recent reports suggest that six Green Beret 
advisers . .. " (the figure six was left out). Also, the two columns in 
this piece were placed in the wrong order. In fact, the item begins, 
"The aggressive defence of US . . . " Editor, TAPOL 
in negotiations with the Indonesian government for a huge 
construction contract to handle a major share in setting up 
the high-pressure electricity transmission system now being 
built throughout the island of Java. The trade resulting 
from this contract could increase the cumulative value of 
Balfour Beatty's exports to Indonesia over the past few 
years to a total of$ 400 million . 
Trade Minister Rees stressed that the conflict that arose 
between Britain and Indonesia over Britain's imposition last 
year of quotas on the import of textile goods from Indon-
esia had "long since been resolved". He had not explained 
that the Thatcher government had reacted so speedily to 
resolve this crisis so as to safeguard Britain's exports to 
Indonesia of Hawk ground-attack jets and other military 
equipment. 
New British capital investments in Indonesia since 
Suharto came to power include a total of 43 projects, al-
together worth S 95.6 million. (This does not include pro-
jects currently under negotiation). 
At the end of his visit, the British Trade Minister also 
announced that Indonesia's Minister of Research, Dr 
Habibie, would be visiting the UK soon. (Sources: 
Pikiran Rakyat, 9 October, and Tempo, 17 October, 1981.) 
requests for more information from us are particularly 
welcome. Editors, T APOL 
Dear TAPOL, 
I feel I ought to mention a mistake in the translation of the 
letter from the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Timar Timur to 
the President of Indonesia (TAPOL Bulletin No. 47, September 
1981, p. 7). 
The word "high-minded" for mulia can definitely be misleading. 
This was a letter written by members of the Indonesian regional 
parliament to their President. It seems extremely doubtful to me 
that they would have used mulia to mean "high-minded" in an 
official plea to their Paymaster. That is to say, of course, unless we 
are to assume further that these members were in such defiant a 
mood that they could not care less if they lose their jobs. 
Translating between distinctly different cultures being (very 
often) quite tricky, the word mulia would probably have been best 
left unmentioned in the translation. If it must be translated, then 
"august"is, to my mind, more faithful to the "spirit" of the original. 
Dear TAPOL, 
Fraternally, 
Taunus Kemasang 
London 
Can you please print in one of the next issues whether there are 
any translations into English or German of the works of Pramoedya 
Ananta Toer. I think not only I am interested. Thank you. Many 
dear greetings. 
Erik Appeltofft 
Esstingen, West Germany 
Yes, we have received several requests like this. We hope to publish 
a list in our next issue. 
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BOOK REVIEW 
Olle Tornquist & Hendrik Amahorseja, 
Ost-Tim or - det glomda kriget , 
(East Timar - the forgotten war) , (in Swedish) 
Stockholm 1981 , 69pp. 
In Sweden a Timar committee has existed for several years, 
and now the group has published this small book. It is 
written by Olle Tornquist, a Swedish Indonesia-specialist, 
who covers the period up until December 197 5, and 
Hendrik Amahorseja, an Indonesian living in Sweden, who 
deals with the period after the invasion. Both writers are 
members of the Swedish group. 
One can criticise this book for some weaknesses. In the 
first place, they forgot to indicate the publisher. The exis-
tence of the group is mentioned once in the text, but the 
address is not given, (see below). 
Secondly , they have not referred to such standard works 
as Jill Jolliff e's book East Timar: Nationalism and Colonial-
ism ( 1978) or Noam Chomsky & Edward Herman's The 
Political Economy of Human Rights (1979). Instead, they 
list many other which, by comparison, seem less essential. 
Thirdly, they have not used any of the many hearings 
held by the US Congress since 1977, during which much 
important information emerged because spokesmen from 
the US administration were pressed to account for Ameri-
can foreign policy in detail. 
Finally , there are some confusing typographical errors, 
and, on page 16, something appears to have been left out: 
Olle Tornquist writes that Jose Ramos Horta visited Indo-
nesia in 197 4, and continues : "The visit was very useful 
which is clear from the following letter from Adam Malik, 
then Minister of Foreign Affairs." A photocopy of Malik's 
letter to Horta should apparently have been placed here, but 
there is nothing. The letter is important, since Malik here 
assures Horta that East Timor has a right to self-determin-
ation no matter who governs the country, a promise he did 
not keep. However, it cost him nothing : today he holds the 
rank of vice-president. A copy of his 1974 letter can be 
found on page 16 of An Act of Genocide by Arnold Kohen 
and John Taylor, a TAPOL publication (1979). 
However, these objections must not overshadow the fact 
that the book is both well written and well documented. It 
exposes the double standards of the Swedish government 
which on the one hand has voted in favour of Timor's 
right to self-determination in the the UN while on the other 
hand exporting weapons to Indonesia. Lately, however, the 
double standards have come to an end : during the UN vote 
in 1980, Sweden for the first time did not support the 
Timor resolution, and has since then asked to join the 
IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia), an organi-
sation of Western countries giving economic assistance to 
Indonesia. 
The book also contains an appendix with FRETILIN's 
program which is moderate and nationalist. 
As the first comprehensive account in a Scandinavian 
language on an issue which is often ignored by the mass 
media, this book by Tornquist and Amahorseja is both 
important and worth reading. 
The book is available from the Swedish Committee, 
address c/o Eva Belfrage, Odelbergsvagen 68, S-121 63 
Johanneshov, postal giro account 1 81 92-5, price 20 
Swedish crowns. 
PEASANTS VICTIMISED 
Thirty peasants from the village of Bajongrenged , T~n­
gerang, in West Java are soon to be tried for trespassing 
and tilling land that is now in the hands of a group of 
senior officials and their wives. 
The land, 21 hectares in all, had been tilled by these 
peasants and their families since 1935 until they were 
ordered some time ago to vacate it because it was going to 
be used as the site for a new Tangerang military command 
(Kodim) headquarters. No Kodim headquarters was built 
however. Instead, the land was handed over to a group of 
senior officials and their wives for their own personal use. 
Feeling that they had been tricked, the peasants decided to 
re-occupy the land and start tilling it again. For this, they 
are now to be charged. 
The Jakarta Legal Aid Institute has announced that it 
will defend the peasants when their case comes before the 
Tangerang District Court. (Merdeka, 4 July, 1981) 
Continued from page 6 
KOPKAMTIB officer. Gunawan had been invited to visit 
the Bupati (district chief) and when he turned up, thinking 
this was a routine affair, he found himself confronted by 
military officers, officials and journalists. 
"You are helping PKI elements formerly under regular 
reporting requirements. I therefore regard you as being like 
them and am handing you over to the LAKSUSDA,"said 
the Bupati, as he handed Gunawan to an officer present in 
the room. Gunawan is now apparently under arrest. 
The peasants who had appealed to him for help com-
plained that village officials forced them to hand over their 
land 'for development' and gave them totally inadequate 
compensation. When Gunawan investigated the title-deeds, 
he found evidence of manipulation and wrote to the Min-
ister of the Interior requesting that action be taken against 
the officials in question. 
With Gunawan now in the hands of the LAKSUSDA, the 
officials have announced that they intend to charge him for 
'insult'. The Bupati who handed him over to KOPKAMTIB 
has told the press that "there are strong suspicions that 
Gunawan has collaborated with and helped ex-PK.I elements 
engaged in provocations". (Tempo, 24 October 1981). 
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